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There can be little doubt that Rational Choice Theory (RCT) - with its emphasis on the 
'instrumentally rational' individual as the foundation of the political process  - has 
significantly enhanced the scope of political science.  This paper details many of the 
areas of political science in which our understanding of events has been significantly  
enhanced by the application of RCT.  But, in the end, RCT in political science raises the 
same questions that it does in economics.  These essentially stem from the fact that for 
RCT, whether in economics or in political science, choice and preference are regarded as 
synonymous.  In consequence,  as Amartya Sen has pointed out, no attention is paid to 
the motivation underlying an action.  As Leif Johansen  –  one of the giants of public 
sector economics  – expressed it:  “economic theory in this, as well as in some other 
fields, tends to suggest that people are honest only to the extent they have economic 
incentives for being so.  This is a homo economicus assumption which is far from being 
obviously true”.  In RCT models, a person is given one preference ordering and, when 
all is said and done, this preference ordering represents his Weltanschauung.  Can one 
preference ordering do all this? The argument of this paper is  that no society can be 
viable without some norms and rules of conduct.  Such norms and rules are necessary 
for viability in fields where strict economic incentives are absent and cannot be created.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Lohmann (1995) observed that, in recent decades, rational choice theory (hereafter, 
referred to as RCT) "has become the rising star of political science….even though 
rational c hoice scholars constitute a minority of political scientists, they publish a 
disproportionate number of articles in the American Political Science Review and they 
are sought after by leading political science departments" (p.127).  If this is indeed the 
case, then what is this magic formula which gives this minority such power and 
influence and, conversely, what is the attitude of the majority of political science 
scholars, who would not describe themselves as "RCT persons", towards this group: do 
they view RCT theorists as redeemers of political science who will place the subject in 
its rightful place among the panoply of social sciences that like to think of themselves as 
'quasi-scientific'? or is RCT simply a dark art and its practitioners the high priests of an 
occult faith which, by promoting the worship of Beelzebub, profanes the true deity?      
 
In this context, it is worth pointing out that the RCT literature also travels under a 
variety of other names:  inter alia public choice theory; social choice  theory; game 
theory; rational actor models; positive political economy; the economic approach to 
politics. However, regardless of the nom-de-guerre adopted by RCT, it always builds on 
the assumption that people choose, within the limits of their knowledge, the best 
available means to achieve their goals.  They are presumed to be 'instrumentally 
rational', meaning that they take actions not for their own sake, but only insofar as they 
secure desired ends
1 (Chong, 1995).   
 
More specifically, Green and Shapiro (1994) identify four salient features of RCT: (i) 
RCT involves utility maximisation or, under conditions of uncertainty, expected utility 
maximisation, which is to say that confronted with an array of options, the rational actor 
                                            
1 One can note parenthetically that an implication of the consequential evaluation of actions, which 
underlies 'instrumental rationality', is that it is diametrically opposed to a deontological approach which 
decides whether or not to undertake an action upon its essential ‘rightness’, irrespective of its 
consequences (Sen, 2001).  For example, the deontological insistence of a Mahatma Gandhi (or Martin 
Luther King or Nelson Mandela) on a non-violent movement  – or the deontological refusal of the 
Democratic Unionist party in Northern Ireland to have any truck with Sinn Fein -  irrespective of its 
consequences, would fly in the face of the consequential approach of  RCT.  The Bhagvad Gita (the 
sacred book of Hindus which is generally regarded as constituting the blue-print for the manner in which a 
'good' Hindu should lead his (her) life) is based upon Krishna recommending a single-minded pursuit of 
duty without thought of the consequences.   3 
chooses the one which affords (or is likely to afford) him (her) the greatest welfare; (ii) 
RCT requires that certain consistency requirements must be satisfied: each individual 
must be capable of ranking options in terms of the welfare they offer him (or her) and 
preferences must be transitive
2; (iii) the relevant unit for the study of the political 
process is the individual: it is the individual, and not groups of individuals, which is the 
basic building block for the study of politics; (iv) RCT claims universality in the sense 
that it applies to all persons at all times.     
 
The rationale  for RCT begins with the observation that in politics, as in economics, 
individuals compete for scarce resources and that, therefore, the same methods of 
analyses used by economists might also serve well in political science.  As Tullock 
(1976) observed, "voters and customers are essentially the same people.  Mr. Smith buys 
and votes; he is the same man in the supermarket and in the voting booth".  Although the 
incursion of the analytical methods of economics into political science - which is the 
hall-mark of RCT - began in the 1950s, it was not until at least three decades later that 
the trickle became a flood.  Today, not only is RCT disproportionately represented in the 
pages of leading political science journals but it has also expanded beyond political 
theory into new fields like international relations and comparative politics (Green and 
Shapiro, 1994).      
 
This application of economic principles to non-market areas, be they in politics or 
elsewhere, may be viewed in a 'thin' sense, meaning an  inclination on the part of 
individuals to satisfy their preferences; alternatively, it may be viewed in a 'thick' sense, 
meaning that whatever the ends people pursue - deciding on a party for which to vote, 
deciding on whether or not to start a family - they do so through instrumentally rational 
behaviour by choosing a course of action which is 'utility-maximising' (Ferejohn, 1991). 
The point is that, as Friedman (1995) reminds us, the possibility that people that people's 
political behaviour  may be underpinned by considerations of self-interest is often 
transformed into the assumption that their political behaviour  is determined by self-
interest. For example, one of the founders of public choice theory
3 argued that "the 
burden of proof should rest with those who claim that wholly different models of 
behaviour apply in the political and economic realms of behaviour" (Buchanan, 1984).    
                                            
2 A preferred to B and B preferred to C must imply that A is preferred to C. 
3 Public Choice theory applies the principles of economic analysis to political (that is, 'public') decision-
making.  It is interpreted in this chapter as being synonymous with RCT.   4 
 
2.  Rational Choice Theory in Politics 
 
In this chapter, the application of RTC to politics is interpreted in the sense of applying 
RTC to 'public' decisions, where it is assumed that the actors on the political stage base 
their actions on self-interest.  In short, RTC is, for the most part, interpreted as 'public 
choice' theory, in the sense defined above, or, as Tullock (1988) succinctly put it,  "the 
invasion of politics by economics".   The intellectual foundations of public choice theory 
lie in five seminal texts: Arrow (1951); Downs (1958); and Olson (1965); Tullock 
(1967); and Nordhaus (1975).  Each of these is discussed below.   
 
Public Choice derives its rationale from the fact that, in many areas, 'political' and 
'economic' considerations interact so that a proper understanding of issues in one field 
requires a complementary understanding of issues in the other.  Much of economic 
activity is carried out in a market environment where the protagonists are households, on 
the one hand, and firms, on the other.  Both sides, according to the rules of economic 
analysis, have clear objectives: households want to consume goods in quantities that will 
maximise their utility and firms want to produce goods in quantities that will maximise 
their profits.  The market allows households to reveal their preferences to firms and for 
firms to meet these preferences in such a way that the separate decisions of millions of 
economic agents, acting independently of one another, are reconciled.   
 
However, a significant part of economic activity involves the state
4 and is, therefore, 
carried out in a non-market environment.  One reason for the existence of such non-
market activities is the existence of 'public goods' or goods supplied by government to 
its citizens.  Of course, the scope of non-market activity depends on the country being 
considered: in Sweden, a range of services - provision of child-care facilities, health, 
education - are provided by government; in the USA these services are provided by the 
market. 
 
Another reason for government involvement in the economy is due to the fact that 
markets do not always operate efficiently.  When they do not, because of 'market 
                                            
4 Between one-third to one-half of GDP in most countries of the OECD is generated through the activities 
of government.   5 
imperfections' leading to 'market failure', then governments have to step in to correct 
such inefficiencies.  These interventions may take the form of corrective taxes and 
subsidies and/or it may take the form of regulation and directives.  At the 
macroeconomic level, governments are responsible for stabilising, and promoting, its 
performance with respect to a number of economic variables: unemployment, inflation, 
the exchange rate, national income etc..   
 
But, whatever the nature, and degree, of governmental intervention in the economy, the 
basic problem that democratically elected governments face is of acting in a manner 
consistent with what its citizens desire.  People express their demands through their 
votes; if there is a mismatch between the demand for, and supply of, outcomes then the 
political market will take 'corrective action' analogous to the corrective action that 
economic markets take when the demand for, and supply of, goods and services is not in 
harmony.   
 
It was dissatisfaction with the inability and failure of traditional political science 
methods to address basic issues in political economy that led to the emergence of the 
new discipline of 'public choice'.  These basic issues were  inter alia: what factors 
influence votes? what is the 'best' system of voting for ensuring a correct revelation of 
preferences? can the actions of individuals be made more effective when they act 
collectively? what is the role  of re-election concerns in determining the supply of 
government output? is there the possibility of conflict between different departments of 
government? The new discipline of public choice explicitly addressed these issues and 
its analysis of was explicitly predicated on the assumption that the behaviour of 
individuals and institutions was motivated by self-interest.    
 
In so doing, public choice theory forcefully reminds political scientists of the view held 
by Machiavelli and Hobbes that many, ostensibly public-spirited, policies may be 
motivated by self-interest; with similar force it reminds economists of the unreality of 
basing analysis of economic policy on the assumption that the state is a 'benevolent 
dictator' acting so as to do 'the greatest good for the greatest number'.  More generally, 
the arrival of public choice signalled a shift from a 'normative' to a 'positive' analysis of 
the political process: the subject matter of public choice was what political actors 
actually do, not what they should do.   6 
  
3.  Voting Procedures 
 
A major contribution of public choice theory has been to expand our knowledge and 
understanding of voting procedures.  The voting problem is one of selecting, on the basis 
of the declared preferences of the electorate, one out of an available set of options.  
Stated in this manner, the voting problem is akin to the problem of social choice where 
individual preferences are to be aggregated to arrive at a notion of 'social welfare'.   
 
For example, every individual in society may rank different 'projects' according to the 
net benefits that they expect to obtain.  The problem is that such a ranking by individuals 
may not lead to a social ranking that is to a ranking to which all individuals in society 
would subscribe.  For example with three individuals (A, B and C) and three projects (X, 
Y and Z) suppose the rankings are as given in the table below: 
 
Table 1: Cyclical Social Preference under Pair-wise Voting 
Preference Ordering  A  B  C 
First Choice  X  Z  Y 
Second Choice  Y  X  Z 
Third Choice  Z  Y  X 
 
Then in a sequence of pair-wise comparisons: X versus Y, Y wins since both A and  
prefer X to Y; Y versus Z, Y wins, since both A and C prefer Y to Z; X versus Z, Z wins 
since both B and C prefer Z to X.  The implied social ordering is that X is preferred to 
Y; Y is preferred to Z; but Z is preferred to X!  The cyclical nature of social preferences 
arises from the fact that the social ordering is not transitive or, in the language of 
electoral studies, there is no Condorcet winner.  Indeed, the problem of social choice is 
not unlike that of voting behaviour: in both cases the issue is one of translating 
individual preferences into an agenda for collective action that faithfully represents these 
preferences.  This was a point noted by Black (1948).   
 
More generally, the possibility of intransitivity in social rankings – of the sort described 
above – is not necessarily the result of obtaining such rankings from pair-wise majority 
rule voting; intransitivity can occur from the application of any rule for creating social 
rankings which satisfies certain minimal properties.  This was demonstrated by Arrow 
(1951), in his celebrated ‘Impossibility Theorem’, when he showed that any social rule   7 
which satisfied a minimal set of fairness conditions
5 could produce an intransitive 
ranking when two or more persons had to choose from three or more projects.   
 
Arrow's result rendered all democratic rules of collective action suspect - the idea that 
the state could act in terms of a well-defined social interest by  aggregating over 
individual preferences (Bergson, 1938) was now rendered invalid.  The work of Black 
(1948) and Arrow (1951) work also drew attention to the potentially unstable nature of 
majority coalitions.  Although the problem of cyclical voting had been known of since 
Condorcet (see below), Black's and Arrow's work brought out its relevance to political 
science.  Variations and extensions of Arrow’s (1951) result have taken the form of 
investigating whether the theorem would continue to be true when one or the other of 
these axioms was weakened.  One line of investigation that has been extensively 
followed is to relax the requirement that social choice must be based on social ordering 
(complete, reflexive and transitive).  Another has been to restrict individual preferences 
to ‘single-peaked’ preferences
6: Arrow showed that if individual preferences are single-
peaked and the number of voters is odd, then majority decision will yield transitive 
social preference
7.        
 
The relevance of the work of Black and of Arrow (op. cit.) to the voting problem lay in 
attempting to identify: (a) the desirable conditions that any voting system should satisfy 
and (b) a voting system that satisfied these conditions.  May (1952) showed that when 
there were only two alternatives, majority voting was unambiguously the best.   The 
problem was to extend this result when there were more than two alternatives.  In such 
situations, different voting systems could be constructed, all of which seemed fair and 
reasonable - and all of which, in the event of two alternatives, yielded majority rule - 
but, which nevertheless yielded different outcomes.   
 
 
                                            
5 These conditions were the axioms of: unrestricted domain (individuals had transitive preferences over all 
the policy alternatives);  Pareto choice (if one project made someone better off than another project, 
without making anyone worse off, then it would be the socially preferred choice); independence (the 
ranking of two choices should not depend on what the other choices were); non-dictatorship (the social 
ordering should not be imposed). 
6 So that the alternatives are arranged in a line so that everyone’s intensity of preference has only one 
peak. 
7 This result earlier discussed in Black (1948) cements the relationship between voting theory and social 
choice theory.    8 
One possible system is plurality ('first-past-the-post') in which each voter votes for 
exactly one option and the option receiving the largest number of votes wins.  One 
problem with this system is that it is based on an incomplete revelation of preferences: 
there is no requirement for a voter to rank the options for which he (she) did not vote.  
As Table 2 shows, on the basis of votes cast by 60 voters, A wins by plurality, yet A 
would lose against B alone (25 to 35) and against C alone (23 to 37). 
 
Table 2: Plurality Voting 
  23 voters  19 voters  16 voters  2 voters 
1
st preference   A  B  C  C 
2
nd preference  C  C  B  A 
3
rd preference  B  A  A  B 
  
This then points to a second defect of plurality voting which is the fact that it is subject 
to agenda manipulation and that the presence, or absence, of options - even if those 
options cannot win - can affect the outcome. 
 
The alternative is for each voter to rank the alternatives in order of preference (as in 
Table 2 above) and then the appropriate electoral rule would aggregate these individual 
rankings into an overall ranking. Such a procedure is termed an 'ordinal procedure'.  One 
possible electoral rule, based on an ordinal procedure, is the  Borda count:  in the 
presence of N options, assign N points to the option ranked first, N-1 points to the option 
ranked second and finally one point to the option ranked last.  A Borda count applied to 
the data in Table 2 sees C a comfortable winner with 138 points, A coming second with 
105 points and B finishing last with 91 points.  The Borda count method, however, is 
also susceptible to false revelation of preferences: voters, irrespective of their true 
preferences, would be inclined to give the lowest preference vote to the candidate they 
thought was most threatening to their preferred candidates electoral prospects (Miller, 
1987).      
 
Both plurality and ordinal procedures may be multistage procedures - so that the chosen 
option only emerges after successive rounds of voting - by combining either of them 
with the possibility of elimination.  Thus, plurality plus run-off eliminates all but the two 
strongest candidates in the earlier rounds leaving a simple run-off between the two 
candidates for the final round.   An alternative is to eliminate in each round the weakest   9 
candidate and to choose a candidate after N-1 rounds of voting.  Although both these 
voting procedures - and variants thereof - are reasonable they don't necessarily lead to 
the same outcome.  For example, in Table 3, taken from Miller (1987): C wins under 
plurality; A, with 50 points, wins under a Borda count; and B wins against C either 
under plurality with run-off or with successive elimination of the weakest candidate. 
 
Table 3: Multi-Stage Voting 
  4 voters  4 voters  2 voters  9 voters 
1
st preference   A  B  B  C 
2
nd preference  B  A  D  D 
3
rd preference  D  D  A  A 
4
th preference  C  C  C  B 
  
The way out, as proposed by Condorcet in 1785, was to have a pair-wise comparison of 
alternatives, choosing, at each comparison, the alternative with greater support.  An 
alternative that wins over all the others is then selected the preferred option and is 
termed the Condorcet winner.  Thus, in Table 2, the Condorcet winner C beats A, 37-23 
and beats B, 41-19.  However, as Table 1 showed, and as Table 4 shows, a Condorcet 
winner need not exist: in Table 3 demonstrates the phenomenon of 'cyclical voting' - also 
termed the 'paradox of voting' - whereby A beats B (33-27); B beats C (42-18); and C 
beats A (35-25). 
 
Table 4: The Paradox of Voting 
  23 voters  17 voters  2 voters  10 voters  8 voters 
1
st preference  A  B  B  C  C 
2
nd preference  B  C  A  A  B 
3
rd preference  C  A  C  B  A 
 
The question, therefore, is whether it is possible to specify conditions under which 
cyclical voting will not occur.  This was addressed by Black (1948 and 1952) using the 
concept of 'single-peaked' preferences.  Suppose that the set of alternatives can be 
represented in one dimension - for example, choice between different levels of public 
expenditure - and suppose that for each voter there is a preferred level of expenditure - 
which may be different for different voters - such that preferences drop monotonically 
for levels on either side of this optimum.  In such a case (see Fig. 1) voter preferences 
are said to be single-peaked.  Under single-peaked preferences, the median voter decides   10
in the sense that the preferred choice of the median voter is the Condorcet winner.  This 
result, which is the celebrated Median Voter Theorem, is illustrated In Figure 1 in which 
there are five voters - V1 to V5 - each with single-peaked preferences.  In a pair-wise 
contest, the preferred choice of the median voter, V3, will beat the preferred choice of all 
other voters. 
 
4.  How Voters Decide 
 
The notion of single-peaked preferences has a certain plausibility in terms of single-
issue politics.  Although the notion of a single-peak can be extended to multidimensional 
issues, the results are far more complex and will not be reported here.  However, if 
voters distil the complexity of issues facing them into a personal ideological position 
(extreme left; left; centrist; right; extreme right) then the Median Voter Theorem can be 
used to predict outcomes in a two-party democracy (Hotelling, 1929; Downs, 1958).  
Suppose that voters are distributed along the spectrum of ideological positions from 'left' 
to 'right' as shown in Figure 3.  Then, if the initial party positions are L and R, R wins: R 
obtains votes from those to the right of R as well as votes from those between X and R, 
where X is the mid-point between L and R; L receives votes from voters to its left as 
well as the votes of those between L and X.   However,  L can increase its vote, as can 
R, by moving closer to the centre.  Inter-party competition will then ensure that each 
party will occupy the 'middle ground' that is adopt the ideological position of the median 
voter.  
 
Downs' (1958)  book is regarded as "one of the cornerstones of contemporary rational 
actor theory" (Monroe, 1991) and, not coincidentally, the theory of voting contained 
within it accords most closely with standard economic theory.  In a Downsian world, 
each voter was rational in the sense that he (she) voted for the party that was believed to 
offer him (her) the greatest benefits.  Party manifestos were an important way by which 
voters evaluated these benefits and consequently, for Downs, such manifestos were a 
means of winning elections.   
 
But because collecting information on parties was expensive, no voter would attempt a 
comprehensive evaluation.  Instead, each voter would confine his (her) evaluation to 
those areas where party differences, in the voter's view, were significantly large.  When   11 
two parties tried to achieve an election-winning position along an ideological position, 
Downs argued (building upon Hotelling's (1929) result) that they would - as discussed 
above - converge upon the median voter's ideological position.  In summary, therefore, 
Downs made a seminal contribution towards understanding the nature of party 
competition, rational ignorance and spatial voting.   
 
5.  Interest Groups and Collective Action 
 
One way that people can reveal their preferences is by voting; another way is by 
associating with like-minded persons to form 'interest groups' which then lobby 
government for favourable treatment.  The problem is that it does not follow from the 
fact that a group of people have a common interest that they will form an interest group 
and bear the cost of collective action.  Olson (1965) pointed out that collective action is 
vitiated by the 'free rider' problem of public economics: an economically rational person 
would not participate in (and share the costs of) an interest group because he (she) 
cannot be excluded from any benefits that may accrue from the activities of the group.  
Consequently, a great deal of potential collective action will not, in fact, materialise.  
This view - emphasising as it did the primacy of the individual -  flew in the face of 
those in political science who regarded organised groups as the basic units in politics.   
 
Olson (op. cit.) argued that two conditions were required for collective action to occur.  
First, the number of persons acting collectively should be relatively small so that if one 
person decided to 'free ride', the group would be rendered ineffective and no benefits 
would accrue.  Second, the group should have access to 'selective incentives' by which it 
could penalise those who have not, and reward those who have, borne the cost of 
collective action.  Trade union 'closed shop' arrangements, by which only members can 
get jobs, is one example of selective incentives.  Selective incentives are less often 
available to potential entrants and to low-income groups.  Thus it is the employed, rather 
than the unemployed that are organised, and it is the professional groups  - doctors, 
teachers, lawyers - that are better organised than unskilled occupations.  For this reason,  
Olson (1982) observed that, in the main, collective action would be anti-egalitarian and 
pro-establishment.  Olson's work elevated the "free rider" problem to a central position 
in political science.  In Mueller's (1989) view, "the free rider problem pervades all of 
collective choice".    12
 
6.  Collective Action and Rent-Seeking 
 
One of the reasons that collective action would be retrogressive is that it would lead to 
'rent-seeking'.  Tullock (1967) was the first to analyse rent seeking.  It is a well known 
proposition in economics that monopoly price will be higher (and output lower) than 
price (and output) under competitive conditions.  This enables a monopolist to earn 
'rent', equivalent to the loss in consumers' surplus from not producing the competitive 
output at the competitive price.  The amount of this rent is the area of the triangle L in 
Figure 3, below.   
 
However, in order to obtain these rents interest groups would be prepared to invest 
resources in order to secure a monopoly position.  Hence the true cost of monopoly is, 
therefore, not just the loss in consumers' surplus but also the total resources invested in 
'rent-seeking activities'.  Such rent-seeking activities may take the form of airline cartels 
lobbying for a monopoly over a particular route; less obviously, it may also take the 
form of a trade union lobbying a firm for 'single union' recognition.  In general, one can 
categorise three types of expenditure (Buchanan, 1980)  associated with rent-seeking: (i) 
expenditure undertaken to secure a monopoly; (ii) the efforts of public officials to react 
to such expenditure; and (iii) third party distortions caused by the rent-seeking activity.  
For example, in a country with exchange controls, commodities may only be imported 
with an import licence.  Businesses may lobby government to be granted such licences 
and the prospect of earning monopoly rents (as businessmen) or of benefiting from the 
largesse of businessmen (as bureaucrats) may dictate the careers of young persons.  
 
The above analysis raises the question: what is wrong with rent seeking activities?  The 
answer is that many rent seeking activities produce profit with producing output.  Such 
activities have been described by Bhagwati (1982) as 'directly unproductive profit-
seeking activities'.  The consequence of contemporary interest in rent-seeking is that a 
great deal of government activity is regarded with suspicion by conservative economists: 
the feeling is much of public sector activity is concerned with providing rents to special 
interest groups and for that, if for no other, reason, small government is good 
government.      
   13 
 
7.  The Political Business Cycle 
 
A key proposition in public choice is that is that economic activity tends to revolve 
around election dates, with governments seeking favourable outcomes just before an 
election and postponing unfavourable till just after an election.  The phenomenon to 
which this gives rise is known as the political business cycle and, since Nordhaus' 
(1975) seminal work in formalising and clarifying the nature of these cycles, this has 
been one of the most researched areas in political economy.   
 
Nordhaus ( op. cit.) focused on the short-run trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment.  In his model, the electorate was only concerned about inflation and 
unemployment and rewarded, or punished, its government according as to whether it 
performed well, or badly, on these two fronts.  But, given the existence of the trade-off, 
it was impossible for a government to do well with respect to both inflation and 
unemployment.  Under these circumstances, Nordhaus (op. cit.) showed that there would 
be a political business cycle of the following form: immediately after an election, the 
government raises the unemployment rate and reduces the inflation rate - this depresses 
inflationary expectations and moves the Phillips curve
8 closer to the origin; closer to the 
election expansionary policies lower the unemployment rate and raise the inflation rate 
but - and this is the crucial point - since the government has 'invested' by bringing the 
Phillips curve closer to the origin, the inflation rate rises, but not by m uch.  The 
government then fights the election on the basis of both a low unemployment and a low 
inflation rate.  
     
8.  Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory 
 
In their celebrated book, Green and Shapiro (1994) offered a critique of RCT as it was 
applied  to political science.  Their essential point was while RCT had led to formidable 
analytical advances in political science, successful empirical applications of rational 
choice models had been few and far between.  In their view, the root of the problem was 
                                            
8 The Phillips curve, due to Phillips (1954), shows a negative relation between inflation and 
unemployment. The position of the curve depends upon the level of inflationary expectations - lower 
expectations move the curve in closer to the origin.   14
RCT had the overweening ambition to arrive at nothing less than universal theories of 
politics - theories that would be true at all times and in all places.  It was this major 
methodological defect that led to a disjunction between theory and reality.    
 
In presenting their critique, Green and Shapiro (op. cit.) were quick to concede the many 
achievements that have emanated from the application of RCT to political science.  But, 
in terms of its consonance with reality RCT contains a number of pathologies.  These 
have been succinctly summarised by Friedamn (op. cit.) and his summary is reproduced 
here:  
A.  RCT scholars engage in 'post hoc theory development': first they look at the facts 
and devise a theory to fit them fail to formulate empirically testable hypotheses. 
B.  If data contrary to the theory later appears, the theory is modified to fit the new facts. 
C.  RCT theories often rely on unobservable entities which make them empirically 
untestable.  
D.  RCT theorists engage in arbitrary 'domain restriction': the theory i s applicable 
whenever it seems to work and not otherwise  
E.  RCT theories are vague about the magnitude of the effects being predicted. 
F.  RCT theories often search for confirming, rather than falsifying, evidence.  
 
9.  Case Study: Vote Transfers in the 1998 Elections to the Northern 
Ireland Assembly 
 
As the previous sections have indicated, our understanding of the voting procedures and 
of the logic of voters has been greatly enhanced by the application of RCT to political 
science.  Yet, according to Green and Shapiro (op. cit.) explaining why people vote 
remains the Achilles heel of RCT.  In a real world election, with a large number of 
voters, each voter knows that his (her) vote will have an infinitesimally small influence 
on the final outcome.  Given the cost of going to the polling booth, it would be 
instrumentally rational not to vote. RCT would predict a zero turnout. Yet, a substantial 
number of people do, in fact, vote. The RCT response to this is either to exempt mass 
elections from the application of RCT on the grounds that instrumental considerations 
would not apply to voting in such elections (see point D of the previous section) or they 
modify their theory to include the 'psychic' benefits that people obtain from being seen 
to do their democratic duty (see point B of the previous section).  Against this   15 
background of the importance of voting both to RCT and its critics, it would be relevant 
to examine a case study involving voting and the post Good Friday elections to Northern 
Ireland's Assembly  are particularly apposite. 
 
Traditionally, voters in Northern Ireland have always voted along community lines: 
Unionist voters vote for Unionist parties – the larger, Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and 
the smaller, Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)  – and Nationalist voters vote for 
Nationalist parties – the larger, Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) and the smaller, 
Sinn Fein (SF). But the Assembly elections of June 1998 in Northern Ireland, which 
involved each of the 18 Westminster constituencies in the Province electing 6 members 
to the Assembly, was the first occasion that voters in the Province were pulled by 
another force. This was the referendum of May 1998, in which 71 per cent of voters said 
«Yes» to the Good Friday Agreement and 29 per cent said «No». The referendum has 
caused a fissure in Unionist politics with the UUP and its allies supporting the 
Agreement and the DUP and its allies opposing it bitterly. The result of this fissure was 
that it was only by a small majority – estimates vary from 52 to 58 per cent – that the 
Agreement was carried in the Unionist community. On the other hand, since both the 
Nationalist parties supported it, the Agreement was overwhelmingly endorsed by 
Nationalists.  
 
The injection of the Agreement into Northern Ireland politics m eant that, in the 
Assembly elections, Unionist voters were voting along two, opposing, dimensions: 
traditional community-based voting which meant sharing their support between the UUP 
and DUP and, on the other hand, Agreement-based voting which meant withholding 
their support for one, or the other, of the Unionist parties while simultaneously, for pro-
agreement Unionists, crossing the community lines to share their support with the 
SDLP.  The mechanism for sharing, or withholding support, was the system of  Single-
Transferable-Voting (STV) which underpinned the elections. Under this system each 
voter writes a number against the name of each candidate listed on the ballot paper and 
this number expresses the voter’s preference for the candidate, the most-preferred 
candidate having 1 against his/her name. After voting for one’s most-preferred 
candidate, support can be extended to another candidate (perhaps from another party) by 
giving him/her one’s second preference; support can be withheld from a candidate by 
not giving him/her any preference or by giving a low preference.  What makes the   16
system operational is that when a voter’s most-preferred candidate is elected, by getting 
votes above the required «quota», the votes in excess of this quota (the «surplus» votes) 
are transferred to the other candidates using these lower preferences. 
 
A good way of studying some of these transfer patterns is by examining how the 
surpluses of candidates elected at the first count was distributed. The reason is that, 
under STV, when someone is elected at the first count, all of his/her votes are examined 
to determine second preferences. However, if a candidate is elected at a count other than 
the first, only those votes received at the count of election are examined for subsequent 
preferences. This latter procedure may give a misleading impression of voter preferences 
for two reasons. First, it offers only a partial picture – the votes received at earlier counts 
are ignored for the purposes of transferring votes. Second, it may offer a misleading 
picture of preferences: a SDLP candidate may be elected and pass on his/her surplus but 
if the last transfers to the candidate were from an eliminated SF candidate then the 
destination of the surplus will reflect the preferences of SF, not SDLP, voters. 
 
Table 5 shows the destination of the surplus of  23 candidates who were elected at the 
first count in the 1998 Northern Ireland Assembly elections. The transfers are classified 
as follows: 
• it is non-transferable if no preference, other than a first-preference, was expressed on 
the ballot paper. 
• it is an intra-party transfer if the second-preference was for a candidate from the same 
party as the elected candidate. 
• it is an intra-community/intra-Agreement transfer if the second preference was for a 
candidate from a different party, but with the same community identity, and the same 
views on the Agreement, as the party of the elected candidate: transfers from the SDLP 
to SF (and vice-versa) would fall into this category. 
• it is an intra-community/cross-Agreement transfer if the second preference was for a 
candidate from a different party and with different views on the Agreement, but with the 
same community identity, as the party of the elected candidate: transfers from the UUP 
to the DUP (and vice-versa) would fall into this category. 
• it is a cross-community/intra-Agreement transfer if the second preference was for a 
candidate from a different party, with a different community identity, but with the same   17 
views on the Agreement, as the party of the elected candidate: transfers from the SDLP 
to the UUP (and vice-versa) would fall into this category. 
• it is a secular transfer if the second preference was for a candidate from a different 
party which did not have a community identity: transfers to the Alliance Party or the 
Women’s Coalition constitute this category of transfers. 
•all other second-preference transfers are classed as other. 
 
The first thing to note about Table 5 is the disparity between the parties in the proportion 
of second-preference votes that they were able to keep within their party (the intra-party 
transfers). The least efficient undoubtedly were the UK Unionists in North Down and 
the Alliance Party in East Belfast: only 57 per cent of those voting for Robert 
McCartney in N orth Down and for Lord Alderdice in East Belfast named their 
respective mates as their second-preference. Indeed, 19 per cent of the McCartney 
surplus votes went to the two DUP candidates (intra-community/intra-Agreement 
transfer), neither of whom were elected and – this was the cruellest cut -12 per cent went 
to the two UUP candidates (intra-community/cross-Agreement transfer), both of whom 
were elected.  For the Alliance Party in East Belfast, the galling fact was that 13 per cent 
of the Alderdice vote was non-transferable.  
 
Among the Nationalist parties, the party loyalty of SDLP voters was severely tested by 
the presence of SF candidates: Gallagher in Fermanagh and South Tyrone could only 
retain 60 per cent of his surplus for his party, losing nearly one-fifth of it to SF and even 
Hume, in Foyle, lost 15 per cent of his massive surplus to SF.  By contrast, Adams in 
West Belfast and Neeson in East Antrim retained well over 80 per cent of their surplus 
for SF and the only reason for the 12 per cent haemorrhage from Adams’ vote was the 
loyalty of voters’ towards the SDLP’s  Joe Hendron.  
 
There was considerable traffic, among Unionist voters, between the Yes and No sides of 
the Agreement (intra-community/cross-Agreement transfers). From the UUP, 17 per 
cent of Trimble’s vote in Upper Bann, 10 per cent of Taylor’s vote in Strangford and 6 
per cent of Wilson’s vote in South Antrim went to anti-Agreement Unionist candidates
9.  
The DUP were no less affected by this cross-Agreement  voter mobility: the leakage 
                                            
9 The fact that 31 per cent of Roy Beggs’ (jnr) vote in North Belfast went to anti-Agreement candidates is 
to be discounted because Beggs, though a UUP candidate, stood on a rejectionist ticket.    18
from the DUP vote to the UUP in North Belfast (Dodds), East Londonderry (Campbell) 
and Strangford (Iris Robinson) was respectively, 14, 10 and 9 per cent. Only the 
Reverend Ian Paisley, in North Antrim, was able to stem this haemorrhage: he passed on 
93 per cent of his surplus to his son. 
 
Against this background of intra-community traffic  – both among Nationalist and 
Unionist voters  – there was little evidence of cross-community mobility in voter 
preferences. Hardly any of the vote from Taylor, Trimble and Wilson went to SDLP 
candidates and SDLP voters returned the compliment when they restricted their second-
preference vote to Nationalist candidates.  
 
So what can one conclude from these results? Mainly that the mould of Northern Ireland 
politics is firmly intact. Voters, in the 1998 elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly, 
were prepared to move between candidates from «moderate» and «extremist» parties: 
the vote transfers between the SDLP and SF was evidence of that. They were prepared 
to swap between pro-Agreement and anti-Agreement candidates.  But, even after the 
most momentous events in Northern Ireland’s short history  - events which offered 
Northern Ireland’s voters an alternative to their traditional voting habits - they were not 
prepared to cross the communal divide. Plus ca change, plus c’est la meme chose. 
 
So how can RCT help us in understanding the outcome of the Northern Ireland 
Assembly elections.  First, in the sense of Downs (1957), parties in Northern Ireland do 
have manifestos but, at the most basic level, these amount to no more than appealing to 
sectarian loyalties: vote for me because I represent a Unionist/Nationalist party and you 
are Unionist/Nationalist.  Underlying this broad sectarian agenda, there is a second, 
class-based manifesto: as a middle-class/working-class Nationalist, vote for the 
SDLP/Sinn Fein; as a middle-class/working-class Unionist, vote for the UUP/DUP.  At a 
primary level, the utility of voters is then determined by sectarian identity, and, given 
that sectarian identity has been taken account of, at a secondary level utility is 
determined by class identity.  What the results do show is that while voters are willing to 
cross the class divide, they were not prepared to cross the sectarian divide even though 
the Good Friday agreement offered them incentives to do so. 
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These results can be 'rationalised' by RCT.  Politics in Northern Ireland is mostly about 
distribution: the cake is sent over from Westminster and what Northern Ireland 
politicians (earlier civil servants) have to do is decide how to slice it.  Given that much 
of the cake consists of public services, which have a strong geographical dimension, and 
given that Northern Ireland's two communities are concentrated in different parts of the 
region, it makes sense to stick with ones sectarian team through thick and thin: let a 
Unionist/Nationalist legislator elected and he (she) will look after you; flirt with the 
'other side' and you could end up with nothing. 
 
But what RCT cannot factor into its analysis elections are two items: the power of 
individual candidates; and the importance of party organisation.  As was argued, neither 
Robert McCartney in North Down nor John Alderdice in East Belfast could convert 
individual popularity into party popularity.  By contrast, the party discipline of Sinn Fein 
meant its vote leakage was minimal.  The interplay between individual and party is a 
very important part of elections held under a Single Transferable Vote system and here it 
is imperative that an individual should not get bigger than the party.  Yet the desire to 
stride the political stage like a Colossus (even so modest a political stage as that offered 
by Northern Ireland) is latent in all our politicians; but those who succumb to its siren 
call see their party's prospects irrevocably damaged.  It is this kind of interplay that RCT 
with its emphasis on instrumental rationality cannot capture.         
 
10.  Conclusions 
 
There can be little doubt that RCT - with its emphasis on the 'instrumentally rational' 
individual as the foundation of the political process - has significantly enhanced the 
scope of political science. To list but some of its achievements:  
(i)  RCT has raised the possibility that democratic institutions might be 
dysfunctional in ways not hitherto imagined (see the discussion of Arrow's 
Impossibility Theorem, above).  
(ii)  RCT has 'explained' the cyclical nature of the economy in terms of electoral 
exigencies (see the discussion of Nordhaus' Political Business Cycle, above). 
(iii)   RCT has 'explained' the tendency for party platforms to converge (see the 
discussion on Downs (1958) and the Median Voter Theorem, above).   20
(iv)  RCT has refined our understanding of the basis on which people vote (Downs, 
1958; Frey and Schneider, 1978; Fiorina, 1981).  
(v)  RCT has drawn attention to the wasteful nature of activities to which government 
involvement in the economy gives rise (see the discussion on Tullock (1967) and 
'rent-seeking'); 
(vi)  RCT has 'explained' the tendency of governments to get ever larger in terms of 
the behaviour, and the manipulation, of democratic institutions (Peltzman, 1980; 
Meltzer and Richards, 1981);  
(vii)  RCT has brought a fresh look to behaviour of bureaucracies and bureaucrats 
(Niskanen, 1971);   
(viii)  RCT has refined our understanding of coalition formation in government through 
the use of new methods of analysis like game theory (Laver and Schofield, 1990; 
Laver and Shepsle, 1996). 
 
But, in the end, RCT in political science raises the same questions that it does in 
economics.  Sen (1977) observed that, in economics, choice and preference are regarded 
as synonymous: I prefer A to B and, therefore, I choose A over B; I am observed to 
choose A over B and, therefore, it must be that I prefer A to B.  Under such a 
tautologous formulation, there is a certain banality in interpreting everyone as acting in a 
self-seeking manner  – by definition, every action is self-seeking since it involves 
choosing the preferred option.  The problem is that in economics, no attention is paid to 
the motivation underlying an action.  A person may act: for self-seeking reasons; out of 
sympathy for a another person; out of a sense of commitment.  Although ‘sympathy’ can 
be incorporated into a utility-maximising framework by allowing external effects (like 
the welfare of ones child) to affect ones utility, ‘commitment’ – which involves doing 
the ‘right’ thing even at the cost of suffering a reduction in utility  - inserts a wedge 
between choice and preference: I choose to vote not because I prefer  - over all the 
options available to me, queuing in front of a polling booth on a Saturday morning - but 
because I want to demonstrate my commitment to democracy.  Similarly, I choose not to 
falsely reveal my preferences when it comes to pricing a public good because I have a 
more overriding commitment to honesty.  As Johansen (1976) – one of the giants of 
public sector economics, which is a subject driven by the free-riding issue – expressed it: 
Economic theory in this, as well as in some other fields, tends to suggest that 
people are honest only to the extent they have economic incentives for being so.    21 
This is a homo economicus assumption which is far from being obviously true.  
No society can be viable without some norms and rules of conduct.  Such norms 
and rules are necessary for viability in fields where strict economic incentives are 
absent and cannot be created. 
In economics, a person is given one preference ordering and, when all is said and done, 
this preference ordering represents his Weltanschauung.  Can one preference do all this? 
If it does, then, as Sen (1977) expressed it, the purely economic man is indeed close to 
being a social moron.  RCT, notwithstanding its dazzling accomplishments, is in danger 
of sending the purely political man in the same direction.   
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Table 5 
Northern Assembly Elections: June 1998 










































































2  8  3  2  1  1  2  0  13  4  0  10 
Intra-Party  57  70  68  -  93  84  84  82  57  66  84  83 
Intra-Community 
Intra-Agreement 








-  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  23  20  0  0 
Secular  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  2  0  1  0 
Other  10  1  1  13  1  1  1  1  5  10  3  2 
TOTAL  100  100  100    100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Figures in parentheses are surpluses 
Source: The Irish Times, 29 June, 1998   25 
Table 5 
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Northern Assembly Elections: June 1998 
































































7  2  0  3  6  29  1  3  3  3  3 
Intra-Party  51  63  75  82  62  60  78  73  78  73  70 
Intra-Community 
Intra-Agreement 








0  1  1  1  0  0  1  1  1  1  0 
Secular  3  4  5  7  11  0  3  8  3  4  3 
Other  3  4  2  1  2  4  2  7  3  3  6 
TOTAL  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Figures in parentheses are surpluses 
Source: The Irish Times, 29 June, 1998 
 
 
 